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The completion of this paper comes coincidentally at a time wh en a book by
a scholarly philosopher, Adolf Grunbaum, entitled The Foundations of Psycho-
analysis: A Philosophical Critique, has just been published and purports to answer
th e question of the scientific status of analysis. This temporall y fo llows Jeffre y
Masson 's work (1) whi ch accuses Freud of abandoning th e so-ca lled seduction
hypothesis and by so doing laying unsound groundwork for th e "science" that
consumes Freud's nearly lim itless energies . In short, it is a period in wh ich
psychoanalysis finds itself condemned, but perhaps in a more vehement and
visible fashion than usual.
To be sure , psychoanalysis has always had to bear th e brunt of vociferous
hostilit y, which incidentally did not trouble Freud, given his understand ing of
the nature of the resistance to the revelations of analysis. Sin ce those head y days
in the early 1950 's wh en analysis enj oyed an unequalled popularity, particula rly
in America, a rather shocking phenomenon has arisen . It seems that a fair
number of analysts nowadays, in contradiction to Freud's most earnestly held
belief, have relinquished the claim that psychoanalysis is a science. If th is is true,
if analysis indeed has no scientific base or methodology, ve ry little remains to
warrant serious consideration. At best it becomes merely one of th e many forms
of psychotherapy, useful for a rather limited range of th e mental di so rders and
accessible to a very small percentage of the population , i.e. , th ose who have the
resources and willingness to engage in th e laborious and often painful process of
confronting the extraordinar ily powerful and nearly intractable fo rces of the
unconscious. Ifpsychoanalysis is nothing more than this, if th e therapy, as Freud
feared, destroys the science, then it remains but an admirable odd ity even to the
most forgiv ing and optimistic of its enthusiasts. In this perspective the following
comments by the narrator of Marie Cardinal's The Words to Say It are full y
j ustified:
Freud was the puppeteer! They were his thick st r ings operating the
little doctor. He was the priest of psychoanalysis, that reli gion in
which a certain pompous, vainglorious and malevolent intell ectual
elite reveled (2).
T he re you have it: a religion , all powder and smoke, hocus-pocus, illusion ,
everything that Freud sought to avoid in his scrup ulous undertaking. The
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strength of Freud's conviction is evident from this revealing passage appearing
in one of the New Introductory Lectures:
It is not permissible to declare that science is one field of human
mental activity and that religion and philosophy are others, at least its
equa l in value, and that science has no business to interfere with the
other two; that they all have an equal claim to be true and th at
everyone is at liberty to choose from which he will draw his co nvic-
tions and in which he will place his belief. A view of this kind is
regarded as particularly superior, tolerant, broad-minded and free
from illiberal prejudices. Unfortunately it is not tenable.. .It is simp ly
a fact that the truth cannot be tolerant, that it admits of no compro-
mises or limitations, that research regards every sphere of human
activity as belonging to it and that it must be relentlessly critical if any
other power tries to take over any part of it (3).
So much for Freud's opinion of illusion. But what does he really mean when he
refers to psychoanalysis as a science, when he says " Psychoana lysis began as a
method of therapy, but I did not want to commend it to your in terest as a
method of therapy but on account of the truths it contains, o n accou nt of the
information it gives us about what concerns human beings most of all-their
own nature" (4)?
First, as implied above, Freud gave no credence to what he ter med the
anarchistic view that there is no such thing as truth , no ass ured kn owledge of the
external world, that "What we give out as being scient ific truth is only the
product of our own needs as they are bound to find utterance unde r changing
external conditions" (5). While acknowledging the intellectual appeal of such
arguments (perhaps similar to that exer ted by Xeno's paradoxes) he deftly notes
their demise in the face of practical exigenc ies , as in th e deci sion to ad minister
one-tenth of a gram or ten grams of morphine to a patient.
Freud saw scientific pursuit as generally slow and laborious, likening
progress in scientific work to that in analysis.
We bring expectations with us into th e work, but they must be
forcibly held back. By observation, now at one point, and now at
another, we come upon something new; but to begin with the pieces
do not fit together. We put forward conjectures, we construct
hypotheses, which we withdraw if they are not confirmed, we need
much patience and readiness for any eventuality, we renounce early
convictions so as not to be led by them into overlooking unexpected
factors .. .In psychoanalysis, however, we have to do without th e
assistance offered to research by experiment (6).
This, by the way, the " puppeteer" !
Freud compared Science to a sculptor modeling cla y (6) , co ntinually
refining, revising, adding and subtract ing until that criterion of truth-
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correspondence to th e external world, or to foll ow th e a r tist 's metaphor, the
"mirror up to nature"-is ach ieved. This metaphor, whi ch lin ks the two pillars
of civilization, Science and Art, is character istic o f Freud, who often claimed
that analysis merely syste matized what great art ists such as Shakespeare and
Goethe had been providing us all along, namely, insights into human natu re .
" T he only subject matter of psychoanalysis is th e mental processes of human
beings and it is only in humans that it can be stu d ied" (7).
As to the position of psychoanalysis with in th e sciences, Freud had th is to
say:
Psychoanalysis is not a specialized branch of medicin e . . . but simply
of psychology. It is certainly not th e whole of psych ology, but its
substructure and perhaps even its entire foundation (8).
In response to th e co ntemptuous criticism that psychoan al ysis is impossible to
consider seriously as a science, being an undertaking wh ose most general
concepts are as lacking in preci sion as libido and instinct, Freud points out that:
This reproach rests on a comple te misconception of th e facts. Clear
basic concepts and shar p ly drawn definitions are only possibl e in th e
mental sciences insofar as th e latter seek to fit a region of facts into
the frame of a logical system. In th e natural sciences, of whi ch
psychology is one , suc h co ncepts are super fluous and indeed impossi-
ble. Zoology and botany did not sta r t from correct and adequate
definitions of an animal and a plant; to this very day biology has been
unable to give any ce r ta in meaning to th e co ncept of life . Physics
itself, indeed, would never have made any advan ce if it had had to
wait until its concepts of matter, force and grav itation , and so on , had
reached the desirable degree of clarity and precision (9).
In summary, Freud firmly and unhesitatingly placed psychoanalysis amid
the other sciences, shar ing with them th e pursuit of truth and th e general
weltanschauung. By creating hypotheses to fit th e obser ved dat a , by continually
being open to new data warranting a revision or even th e wholesale demolit ion
of such hypotheses, th e investigation of th e "mental processes of human
beings," a wide and rich domain that includes every sphere of human activity
would humbly proceed. That the conditions for conducting this investiga tion
ca lled for the practicing of th e therapy is a distinguishing feature of psychoanal-
ysis, but one that in no way diminishes its scientific status .
But let us pause to clarify our own ideas of what co ns titu tes a scientific
enterprise and what does not. Science, as etymologicall y implied, seeks to know;
it seeks the truth about the world-including th e inner nature of man- and
attempts systematically to account for natural phenomena. For some sciences
the task is made easier by th e ability to isolate variables and run experiments.
The task is less clear-cut for o thers, which often suffe r th e taint of being
condemned as unscientific, probably owing to the fac t that today most conceive
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of science as a pure realm of immutable facts, precise experiments an d double-
blinded, randomized, placebo-controlled studies. This latter view is a gross
misconception that deserves to be placed alongside those narrow attempts of
sociologists and philosophers to establish firm criteria for scientificity th at
betoken very little understanding of their subject.
To return to the matter of whether psychoanalysis deserves to be ca lled a
science, I will draw heavily from a remarkably lucid paper by Robert Waelde r
(10). First, Waelder distinguishes various self-explanatory levels of th e psych oan-
alytic process: observation; clinical interpretation; clinical generali zation ; clini-
cal theory; metapsychology; and finall y, Freud's philosophy. T he last two are
regarded as being far less important than the others. Of th e metapsych ologica l
hypotheses, Freud himself said that they "are not the bottom but th e top of the
whole structure, and they can be replaced and discarded without damagin g it "
(11 ).
Outsiders, and 1 include the sociologist and philosopher among them,
generally have no idea of what analytic data are. Never having undergone an
analysis nor having pursued the rigorous training that would give them an
opportunity to acquire data as an analyst , they remain necessarily uninformed .
In a sense, the analyst's unique method of gathering data, th e ana lytic session-
that special circumstance that constitutes the wellspring of materia l on which
psychoanalysis bases its findings, can be likened to microscopy. Just as th e
ignoranti who have never so much as seen a microscope condemned and
ridiculed Leuwenhoek's descriptions of the marvelous organism s and str uc tures
he espied, so do similarly disposed individuals manufacture diatribes aga inst
analysis. The technique of free association-and this cannot be overempha-
sized-makes the analyst privy to a whole world of data unmet within ordinary
circumstances, and generally inaccessible. Criticisms of psychoanalysis that pay
no heed to this fact cannot be taken seriously.
Waelder (10) examines the so-ca lled exact sciences, suc h as chemist ry and
physics (one should bear in mind that he himself had been a physicist before an
analyst) and gleans four prerequisites for their exactitude:
1. Events must be contemporary, able to be repeated over and over, like the
movements of the stars, or at will.
2. Variables must be loosely coupled so that it becomes possible to isolate
the effect of one. When they are coupled closely, evidence fo r ca use and
effect becomes difficult to ascertain, for when one var iable changes, by
definition the others change simultaneously.
3. The subj ect under investigation must not change significantly dur ing th e
course of the investigation , otherwise new unknowns are introduced.
4. The subjects under study must be sufficiently small so that what happens
to individual units, e.g., a single electron, has little importance , sin ce only
the aggregate matters, thus rendering statistical management adequate
and appropriate.
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Psychoanalysis obviously meets none o f th e above. It s subject-Man-is a
complex composite of closely coupled var iab les , as indeed every organism is,
which changes constantly and does not lend itself to statistical treatment in any
meaningful way. It surely is an implicit and neces sary virtue of ana lysis that the
behavior of an individual unit, unlike the e lec tro ns in Boh r 's model of the
h ydrogen atom, is of th e utmost significance; indeed, o ne can measure the
progress of civiliza t ion by its increasing regard fo r the individual. Note,
however, that neither th e biological nor social sciences meet these cr iteria .
Evolution , certainly co nside red o ne of th e most important scientific advances in
th e world's history, has very little " di rect" evi dence in its support. Its appeal lies
in th e fact th at any other proposed interpretation o f the data with which it
concerns itself is far less satisfactory. Our beli ef th at Co lumbus arrived in
America in 1492 is similar ly founded, to Waelder's example (10). The existing
evidence is indirect and circumstantial , consisting of letters, scattered reports,
and th e like. No present day Methuselah can testi fy to h is setting foot on shore,
but this reconstruction of events fits suc h a ma ss of data from so many varied
sources that the probability of co inc idence is infinitesim al. O r to quote Stephen
Jay Gould, " We kn ow that the sun is hub to our lit tle co rner of the universe, and
th at ties of ge nealogy co nnect a ll livin g thi ngs on our planet, because th ese
th eories asse mble and ex p lain so much otherwise disparate and unrelated
information . . ." (12) .
T hus psych oan alysis. Concepts that have evolved from the enormous mass
of data derived from the analyti c setting simply present th e best fit.
With respect to Karl Popper's contentio n th at an alytic theories are not
"falsifiable ," it sho uld be noted that throughout th e history of psychoana lysis
theories have continually been proposed, revised, and rejected , a ll in accordance
with th e scient ific method that requires an honest accounting of the observed
phenomena. T o cite a specific exa mple of th e fa lsifiabi lit y of analytic theories,
repression as th e sine qua non of neurosis co u ld be d isproved simply by the
presentation o f a case in whi ch all inner co nflic ts have never ceased to be full y
ac cessibl e to co nsc ious ness and no repression of any aspect of them can be
detected, to paraphrase Waelder (10) o nce again .
Even tually it seems th at psych oanalytic th eory mi gh t be confirmed or
in validat ed by th e sort of direct, exper imen ta l ev idence we associate with the
"exact" sciences. However, a ttempts of this kind would requi re an exquisite
mastery of analytic co ncepts as well as uncommon ingenuity to earn validity
th emsel ves. Until th en we ma y be co nten t to say of th e method of psychoanaly-
sis, like th at of Zadig , "Nothing ca n be more hopelessly vu lgar, more unlike the
maj esti c development of a system of grandly unintelli gible conclusions fr om
sublimely inconceivable premises suc h as del ights the magian hear t" (13). And it
may be th at precisely in its " vu lgar" preoccu pation with the truth about man 's
dark impulses, in its ruthless di savowal of th e fict ions perpet rated by personal o r
organized religions, ana lysis has incited th e heated but un founded accusations
that it is not truly a science . That members of the analytic profession should
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participate in the chorus might well be an indication of the power ful need for the
comforts of Illusion within us all.
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